A polar coding scheme is proposed for the Wiretap Broadcast Channel with two legitimate receivers and one eavesdropper. We consider a model in which the transmitter wishes to send a private and a confidential message that must be reliably decoded by the receivers, and the confidential message must also be (strongly) secured from the eavesdropper. The coding scheme aims to use the optimal rate of randomness and does not make any assumption regarding the symmetry or degradedness of the channel. This paper extends previous work on polar codes for the wiretap channel by proposing a new chaining construction that allows to reliably and securely send the same confidential message to two different receivers. This construction introduces new dependencies between the random variables involved in the coding scheme that need to be considered in the secrecy analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic security over noisy channels was introduced by Wyner in [1] , which characterized the secrecycapacity of the degraded wiretap channel. Later, Csiszár and Körner in [2] generalized Wyner's results to the general wiretap channel. In these settings, one transmitter wishes to reliably send one message to a legitimate receiver, while keeping it secret from an eavesdropper, where secrecy is defined based on a condition on some information-theoretic measure that is fully quantifiable. One of these measures is the information leakage, defined as the mutual information I(S; Z n ) between a uniformly distributed random message S and the channel observations Z n at the eavesdropper, n being the number of uses of the channel. Based on this measure, the most common secrecy conditions required to be satisfied by channel codes are the weak secrecy, which requires lim n→∞ 1 n I(S; Z n ) = 0, and the strong secrecy, requiring lim n→∞ I(S; Z n ) = 0.
Information-theoretic security has been extended to a large variety of contexts, and polar codes [3] have become increasingly popular in this topic due to their easily provable secrecy capacity achieving property. Secrecy capacity achieving polar codes for the binary symmetric degraded wiretap channel were introduced in [4] and [5] , satisfying the weak and the strong secrecy condition, respectively. Recently, polar coding has been extended to the general wiretap channel in [6] - [9] and to different multiuser scenarios (for instance, see [10] and [11] ).
This paper provides a polar coding scheme that allows to transmit strongly confidential common information to two le-gitimate receivers over the Wiretap Broadcast Channel (WBC). Although [12] provided an obvious lower-bound on the secrecy capacity of this model, no constructive polar coding scheme has been proposed so far. Our polar coding scheme is based mainly on the one introduced by [9] for the broadcast channel with confidential messages. Thus, the proposed polar coding scheme aims to use the optimal amount of randomness in the encoding. Moreover, in order to construct an explicit polar coding scheme that provides strong secrecy, transmitter and legitimate receivers need to share a secret key of negligible size in terms of rate, and the distribution induced by the encoder must be close in terms of statistical distance to the original one considered for the code construction. Nevertheless, the particularization for the model proposed in this paper is not straightforward. Specifically, we propose a new chaining construction [13] that is crucial to securely transmit common information to different legitimate receivers. This construction introduces new dependencies between the random variables that are involved in the polar coding scheme that must be considered in the secrecy analysis.
A. Notation
Through this paper, let u n denote a row vector. We write u 1:j for j ∈ [1, n] to denote the subvector (u(1), . . . , u(j)). For any set of indices S ⊆ [1, n], we write u[S] to denote the sequence {u(j)} j∈S , and we use S C to denote the set complement in [1, n] , that is, S C = [1, n] \ S. Consider some index i ∈ [1, L], where L ∈ Z + , and consider the vector u n i . We write u n 1:L to denote the set of vectors {u n 1 , . . . , u n L }.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND ACHIEVABLE REGION
with 2 legitimate receivers and an external eavesdropper is characterized by the probability transition function p Y (1) Y (2) Z|X , where X ∈ X denotes the channel input, Y (k) ∈ Y (k) denotes the channel output corresponding to the legitimate receiver k ∈ [1, 2] , and Z ∈ Z denotes the channel output corresponding to the eavesdropper. We consider a model, namely Common Information over the WBC (CI-WBC), in which the transmitter wishes to send a private message W and a confidential message S to both legitimate receivers. A code 2 nRW , 2 nRS , 2 nRR , n for the CI-WBC consist of a private message set W 1, 2 nRW , a confidential message set S 1, 2 nRS , a randomization sequence set R 1, 2 nRR (typically referred as local randomness), an encoding function f : W × S × R → X n that maps (w, s, r) to a codeword x n , and two decoding functions g (1) and g (2) such that g (k) : Y n (k) → W × S maps the observations y n (k) of the legitimate receiver k to the estimates (ŵ (k) ,ŝ (k) ). The reliability condition the code must satisfy is
and the strong secrecy condition is given by
A triple of rates (R W , R S , R R ) ∈ R 3 + is achievable if there exists a sequence of ( 2 nRW , 2 nRS , 2 nRR , n) codes such that satisfy the conditions (1) and (2) . The achievable region is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate triples.
Proposition 1 (Adapted from [12] , [14] ): The region given by the union over the tiples of rates (R W , R S , R R ) satisfying
where the union is taken over all distributions p V X such that V − X − (Y (1) , Y (2) , Z) forms a Markov chain, defines an inner-bound on the achievable region of the CI-WBC.
III. POLAR CODING SCHEME
Let (V ×X ×Y (1) ×Y (2) ×Z, p V XY (1) Y (2) Z ) denote the DMS that represents the input (V, X) and the output (Y (1) , Y (2) , Z) random variables of the CI-WBC, where |V| = |X | = 2 (binary polarization). Without loss of generality, and to avoid the trivial case R S = 0 in Proposition 1, we assume that
If H(V |Y (1) ) < H(V |Y (2) ), one can simply exchange the role of Y (1) and Y (2) in the encoding scheme of Section III. We propose a polar coding scheme that achieves the rate triple
For the input random variable V of the DMS, we define the polar transform A n V n G n and the sets
For the input random variable X, we define the polar transform T n X n G n and the associated sets
The non-degraded nature of the broadcast channel means having to use a chaining construction [13] . Therefore, consider that the encoding takes place over L blocks indexed by i ∈ [1, L] . At the i-th block, the encoder will construct the sequenceÃ n i , which will carry the private and the confidential messages intended to both legitimate receivers. Additionally, the encoder will store intoÃ n i some elements fromÃ n i−1
) so that both legitimate receivers are able to reliably reconstructÃ n 1:L . Then, givenṼ n i =Ã n i G n , the encoder will perform the polarbased channel prefixing to constructT n i . Finally, it will obtaiñ X n i =T n i G n , which will be transmitted over the WBC inducing the channel outputs (Ỹ n (1),i ,Ỹ n (2),i ,Z n i ).
A. General polar-based encoding
The private and confidential message encoding aims to construct the sequencesÃ n 1:L , while the polar-based channel prefixing aims to construct the sequencesX n 1:L givenÃ n 1:L . Consider the construction ofÃ n 1:L . Besides the previous sets associated to A n , we define the partition of H (n) V :
Moreover, we also define
which form a partition of the set G (n) , and
which form a partition of C (n) . These sets are represented in Figure 1 . Roughly speaking,
] is suitable for storing information to be secured from the eavesdropper, whereasÃ i [C (n) ] is not. Sets in (7)-(14) with subscript 1 (sets inside the red curve in Figure 1 
V |Y (k) ) C ], according to [15] , is the nearly uniformly distributed part required by legitimate receiver k to reliably reconstructÃ n i entirely by performing SC decoding. For sufficiently large n , assumption (3) implies Fig. 1 : Graphical representation of the sets in (5)- (14) . The indices inside the soft and dark gray area form G (n) and C (n) respectively. The indices that form H
) C are those inside the red curve, while those inside the blue curve form H
This implication is formally justified in the full version of the paper, and entails having to consider four different cases:
The generic encoding process for all cases is summarized in
1,2 ] is required by legitimate receiver 2 to reliably estimateÃ n i entirely and, thus, the encoder repeats [Ψ
(the function form_A G is responsible of the chaining construction and is described later). On the other hand, [Θ
1,2 ] is required by legitimate2 receiver 1. Nevertheless, in order to satisfy the strong secrecy condition in (2), the encoder does not repeat the sequence 
Γ . Since these secret keys are reused in all blocks, it is clear that their size becomes negligible in terms of rate for sufficiently large number of blocks L.
The function form_A G in Algorithm 1 aims to construct the sequencesÃ 1:L [G (n) ] depending on each particular case. This part of the encoding is summarized in Section III-B.
Then, givenÃ i [C (n) ∪ G (n) ], the encoder forms the remaining entries ofÃ n i as follows. If j ∈ L (n) V , the encoder constructsÃ i (j) deterministically by using SC encoding as in [16] . Otherwise,
V ] is constructed randomly. Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], givenṼ n i =Ã n i G n , a randomization sequence R i and a uniformly distributed random sequence Λ (V ) 0 , the encoder performs the polar-based channel prefixing Algorithm 1 Generic PC encoding scheme Require: W1:L, S1:L, R1:L, Λ
ΥΦ (k) to the receiver k ∈ [1, 2] 23 returnX n 1:L (function pb_ch_pref in Algorithm 1) to obtainX n i , which is transmitted over the WBC inducingỸ n (1),i ,Ỹ n (2),i andZ n i . For i ∈ [1, L], the encoder gets Φ (V ) (k),i , k = [1, 2] , required by the legitimate receiver k. Since this sequence is not nearly uniform, the encoder cannot make it available to the corresponding receiver by means of the chaining structure. Also, the encoder obtains Υ (V ) (k) , which is needed for the k-th legitimate receiver to initialize the decoding process. Thus, the transmitter additionally sends (Υ
ΥΦ (k) being a uniformly distributed key with negligible size in terms of rate (proved in the full version).
B. Function form_A G .
For i ∈ [1, L], let S i denote a uniformly distributed vector that represents the confidential message. Function form_A G encodes the confidential messages S 1:L and builds the chaining construction. According to Algorithm 1, in addition to S i , the encoder stores intoÃ i [G (n) ] the sequences Ψ
, and the sequencesΘ (2) . Therefore, Ψ
] is needed by receiver 2 to reliably reconstructÃ n i−1 , but can be inferred by receiver 1 giveñ (1) ) C ]. Thus, the encoder will repeat the sequence Ψ
Similarly, from (12) , we have C
] is needed by receiver 1 to reliably reconstructÃ n i+1 , but can be reliably inferred by receiver 2 givenÃ i [(L (n) V |Y (2) ) C ]. Hence, the encoder will repeat, if possible, the sequenceΘ
Finally, from (14), we have C
i+1 are needed by both receivers to reliably reconstructÃ n i−1 andÃ n i+1 respectively. Consequently, the encoder will repeat, if possible, Γ (2) ]. Indeed, both sequences are repeated in the same entries ofÃ i [G 
and, consequently, only some entries ofΘ
Continuing with the construction ofÃ 1:L [G (n) ] for Case A, we describe next the encoding of S 1:L . Let R
being any subset with size |G (1) ] . From (15) , it is easy to prove that R 
] will be intended for S L . Finally, at any block i ∈ [2, L], the entries
for any i ∈ [2, L] and is replicated in all blocks. The construction ofÃ 1:L [H (n) V ] for the Case A is represented in Figure 2 . For a formal description of the encoding for each case, see the full version of this paper.
C. Decoding
Given Υ (V ) (1) (elements inside the red curve at block 1 in Figure 2 ) and Φ (V ) (1),1 , receiver 1 reconstructs the remaining entries ofÃ n 1 . Then, it recovers Θ from S1 is represented by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks. (1) ) C ] (all entries inside the red curve at block 2), and can reconstructÃ n 2 . This procedure is almost the same at the remaining blocks, but for i ∈ [2, L − 1], receiver 1 gets Γ
i+1 (blue any yellow diamonds at block 2). Nevertheless, since Γ (V ) i−1 (blue triangles) has already been obtained, this receiver recoversΓ V |Y (2) ) C ] (entries inside the blue curve at block 3), and can reconstructÃ n L−1 . At block i ∈ [2, L − 1], receiver 2 gets Γ
i+1 (cyan triangles) has already been obtained, the receiver computesΓ
i+1 (cyan triangles with a line through them) and then obtains Γ
i+1 (red triangles).
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE POLAR CODING SCHEME
The analysis of the polar coding scheme of Section III leads to the following theorem.
be an arbitrary WBC such that X ∈ {0, 1}. The polar coding scheme described in Section III achieves the corner point in (4) of the region defined in Proposition 1.
The formal proof of Theorem 1 follows in four steps and is provided in the full version of the paper. First, we prove that the polar coding scheme approaches the rate triple in (4) . In this step, we also show that the overall length of the secret keys is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate. Then, for any block i ∈ [1, L], we prove that the joint distribution induced by the encodingq V n i X n i Y n (1),i Y n (2),i Z n i and the one of the original DMS p V n X n Y n (1) Y n (2) Z n are nearly statistically indistinguishable for sufficiently large n. Finally, the reliability and secrecy performance of is analyzed in the last steps.
In particular, with respect to the secrecy analysis, we show that I(S 1:L ;Z n 1:L ) n→∞ − −−− → 0. For clarity and with slight abuse of notation,
The dependency graph between the random variables of adjacent encoding blocks is represented in Figure 3 . In order to prove that the polar coding scheme satisfies (2), first we find an equivalent dependency graph that is causal (with no cycles due to the backward dependencies). Backward dependencies involving random sequences that are copied in any part of A i [(H (n)
V |Z ) C ], i ∈ [1, L], are problematic for the strong secrecy evaluation. Also, we prove that strong secrecy holds for any block i ∈ [1, L], and the eavesdropper observationsZ n i at block i are asymptotically statistically independent of all eavesdropper observationsZ n 1:i−1 at previous blocks. Indeed, the secret seed κ (V ) Ω is required for the polar coding scheme to break these dependencies from adjacent blocks. We conjecture that κ (V ) Ω is not needed for the polar coding scheme to satisfy the strong secrecy condition. However, we cannot evaluate dependencies by using an appropriate Bayesian graph. A further discussion about the role of the secret seed κ (V ) Ω can be found in the long version of this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
A strongly secure polar coding scheme has been proposed for the WBC with two legitimate receivers and one eavesdropper. This polar code achieves the best known innerbound on the achievable region of the CI-WBC model, where transmitter wants to send private and confidential messages to both receivers. Due to the non-degradedness assumption of the channel, the encoder builds a chaining construction that induces bidirectional dependencies between adjacent blocks. These dependencies need to be taken carefully into account in the secrecy analysis and make the use of secret seeds crucial.
